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Abstract
This paper evaluates partial acquisition strategies. The model al-
lows for buying a share of a ﬁrm before the actual acquisition takes
place. Holding a share in a competing ﬁrm before the acquisition of
another ﬁrm, outsider-toehold, eliminates the insiders’ dilemma, i.e.
proﬁtable mergers do not occur. This strategy may thus be more prof-
itable for a buyer than acquiring entire ﬁrms at once. Furthermore,
the insiders’ dilemma arises from the assumption of a positive exter-
nality on the outsider ﬁrm and acquiring an outsider-toehold is thus
a signal of an anti-competitive merger.
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11 Introduction
Some markets are characterized by cross ownership with ﬁrms holding shares
in rival ﬁrms. These markets have essential implications for merger pattern
and merger policy.
It has been shown in economic theory that there exists an important
obstacle to anti-competitive mergers in oligopolies: being an outsider to an
anti-competitive merger is often more proﬁtable than participating, since
outsiders beneﬁt from a price increase, but need not reduce output them-
selves. This was ﬁrst pointed out by Stigler (1950) and is consistent with a
simple Cournot or Bertrand model and referred to as the insiders’ dilemma.
In the endogenous merger literature, Stigler’s point is central. Kamien
and Zang (1990), a pioneering work in this ﬁeld, studied a non-cooperative1
endogenous merger model where ﬁrms simultaneously oﬀer bids for the other
ﬁrms and an asking price for the own ﬁrm, showing that the acquisition
process may fail and the market structure will remain, despite monopoly be-
ing proﬁtable. Consider, for example, a three ﬁrm industry where one ﬁrm
tries to acquire the other two. By unilaterally rejecting the oﬀer and becom-
ing an outsider, a target will proﬁt from a duopoly. Hence, in equilibrium,
both ﬁrms require a duopoly proﬁtt oa c c e p tt h eo ﬀer. A buyer may not
aﬀord this high bid and the triopoly remains. This result arises from the
assumption of a positive externality on the outsider.2
This simultaneous merger game was later developed by Kamien and Zang
(1993). They then introduced sequential acquisitions where a buyer in the
ﬁrst period only has to pay a triopoly proﬁtf o rt h eﬁrst ﬁrm but in the
1For cooperative endogenous merger models see e.g. Horn and Persson (2001).
2Models studied by Szidarovszky and Yakowitz (1982), Salant, Switzer and Reynolds
(1983), Perry and Porter (1985) and Deneckere and Davidson (1985) show that outsider
proﬁts may be positive or negative depending on the situation.
2second period, it still needs to pay a duopoly proﬁt. Although this mitigates
the insiders’ dilemma, it still is considerable. Lindqvist and Stennek (2001)
also demonstrate the existence of this dilemma in a laboratory.
Models within industrial organization often treat ﬁrms as one indivisible
unit. In contrast, the ﬁnance literature often divides a ﬁrm into many shares
with corresponding stockholders but treats the takeover exogenously, only
l o o k i n ga tt h et w om e r g i n gﬁrms or possibly many ﬁrms in a bidding com-
petition for a target. In the ﬁnance literature, it has long been argued that
before the acquisition, it is proﬁt a b l et ob u yas m a l ls h a r eo ft h et a r g e tﬁrm.3
This is referred to as a toehold. Firms with a toehold have an advantage in
a bidding contest when the remaining ﬁrm will be sold out. A potential
acquirer needs to pay a premium for fewer shares or, if losing the bid, gains
from selling out the toehold at a proﬁt. Grossman and Hart (1980) show that
this kind of takeovers may have some complications since the buyer must pay
at least the value of the remaining stocks if the bid succeeds, which may not
be proﬁtable for the buyer. This work was later developed by Bagnoli and
Lipman (1988), arguing that the seller in the target ﬁrm must be pivotal for
an equilibrium to exist.
Some arguments against controlling mergers have been raised due to the
insiders’ dilemma.4 However, this paper suggests a theoretical solution to
Stigler’s point. The insiders’ dilemma is likely to be less prominent when
cross ownership exists since the merged ﬁr mh o l d ss h a r e si nr i v a lﬁrms, i.e.
outsider-toeholds,b e n e ﬁting from the price increase following the merger.
3See e.g. Malueg and Schwartz (1991), Bulow, Huang and Klemperer (1999), Ravid and
Spiegel (1999) and Högfeldt and Högholm (2000) for theoretical work and Bradley, Desai
and Kim (1988), Franks and Harris (1989), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Stulz Walkling
and Song (1990), Van Hulle, Vermaelen and Wouters (1991), Jennings and Mazzeo (1993)
and Betton and Eckbo (2000) for empirical studies. See Lindqvist (2003) for an extended
literature description and results.
4See e.g. Fridolfsson and Stennek (2004) for arguments against merger control.
3Hence, buying outsider-toeholds before an acquisition can solve this puzzle.
There is also a policy implication from this result. The insiders’ dilemma
arises from the assumption of a positive externality on the outsider ﬁrm and
acquiring an outsider-toehold is thus a signal of an anti-competitive merger.
This result can also imply another interpretation of toeholds theoretically
and empirically studied in the ﬁnance literature.
The purposes of this paper are to study under which circumstances outsider-
toeholds increase incentives for mergers and under which circumstances a
competition authority can use outsider-toeholds as a signal of anti-competitive
mergers. In a broader view, this paper tries to link the modelling of the ﬁ-
nance and industrial organization merger literature to explain merger strate-
gies and market outcomes.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model for
two cases; single owner ﬁrms and ﬁrms listed on a stock market, i.e. ﬁrms
with multiple owners, section 3 provides some empirical validity and policy
implications and section 4 concludes.
2M o d e l
Initially the industry consists of three ﬁrms; one buyer (ﬁrm a)a n dt w o
sellers (ﬁrms b and c). Due to cash limits, cross-border constraints etc., ﬁrm
a may be the only valid acquirer and this market situation may thus arise.
The model starts with an acquisition game before the ﬁrm(s) enter(s) the
market. The acquisition game consists of three periods, k. I ne a c hp e r i o d ,
the buyer can choose not to bid or oﬀer one bid to a seller. If a buyer ceases
to bid, the acquisition game closes and the ﬁrm(s) enter(s) the market. The
buyer oﬀers one bid, (pk
i,b k
i), by stating the target ﬁrm, i ∈ (b,c), the size of
4the bid (transaction price), bi ∈ R, and the claiming share, pi ∈ [0,1].T h i s
bid can only be rejected or accepted by the corresponding seller. A selling
ﬁrm vanishes from the market if and only if the entire ﬁrm is acquired, i.e.
P3
k=1 pk
i =1 , where pk
i =0for a rejecting bid or a closed period.
After the acquisition game the ﬁrm(s) enter(s) the market. The market
can be treated as one period with three diﬀerent proﬁt levels for one ﬁrm. If
t h em a r k e tc o n s i s t so ft h r e eﬁrms, there is a triopoly where each ﬁrm proﬁts
π(3),t w oﬁrms each proﬁt π(2) in a duopoly and a monopoly ﬁrm proﬁts
π(1),w h e r eπ0(n) < 0, ∀n ∈ (1,2,3).5 The proﬁt structure is based on
the assumption that a single manager of each ﬁrm only acts in the interest
of its own ﬁrm, trying to maximize the proﬁto ft h a tﬁrm. This implies
that the proﬁt structure becomes symmetric, since the owner structure is
not considered by the manager. However, the owner(s) take(s) all decisions
about the owner structure, i.e. if buying a share or making a full acquisition
of another ﬁrm.6
The solution concept is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. To ﬁnd the
market outcomes, the analysis is divided into two parts depending on the
number of owners for each ﬁrm. We start with the single owner case.
5Another way of deﬁning proﬁts is to use the Cournot model, where each ﬁrm optimizes
its proﬁt given the current ownership structure. Furthermore, a discounting factor can
be introduced allowing for inﬁnite number of periods. In fact, these assumptions were
considered in an earlier version of this paper but were, for simplicity, changed to a ﬁxed
proﬁt since the main results still hold.
6Note that the proﬁt structure is assumed to be symmetric even after a merger, i.e. two
merging ﬁr m sw i l lh a v et h es a m ep r o ﬁt as the non merging ﬁrm. Another possible assump-
tion is to assume that the two merging ﬁrms have a proﬁt twice that of the non merging
ﬁrm. In a real market the truth may be somewhere between these two extremes which
implies that the insiders’ dilemma is still prominent (but decreases when approaching the
latter extreme case).
52.1 Single owners
In this section, the ﬁrm has one owner. Let us start with a benchmark
strategy when the buyer monopolizes the market without partial acquisitions,
i.e. pk
i =1 , ∀i. Note that this requires the buyer to acquire one ﬁrm in each
period 1 and 2, respectively.
1. a acquires b
2. a acquires c
3. No bid
In the last period, the buyer cannot oﬀer any bid since there exist no
other ﬁrms in the market. It must pay a duopoly proﬁt in the second period.
In the ﬁrst period, seller b accepts a bid of a triopoly proﬁt in equilibrium,
if it is unproﬁtable for a buyer to form a duopoly, i.e. π(2) < 2π(3),w h i c h
is illustrated as to the left of line 2 in Figure 1.7
In the market the buyer proﬁts from a monopoly, π(1),a f t e rt h et w o
acquisitions. The value of the ﬁrm, va, must exceed the initial triopoly proﬁt,
π(3), for the buyer to monopolize the market in equilibrium, i.e.
va = π(1) − π(2) − π(3) ≥ π(3),( 1 )
which is illustrated in Figure 1 at or above line 4. In addition, subgame
perfection of the equilibrium requires that the buyer has no incentive to
deviate from the current strategy. In particular, upon reaching the second
period, the buyer should still have an incentive to buy the remaining ﬁrm,
i.e.
π(1) − π(2) ≥ π(2),( 2 )
7Assume that the buyer strategy is to bid for ﬁrm b also in the second period, if ﬁrm b
rejects the ﬁrst period oﬀer. In equilibrium ﬁrm b does not increase its payoﬀ if rejecting
in the ﬁrst period, and accepting already in period one is thus a Nash equilibrium.
6Figure 1: The Insiders’ Dilemma
which holds at or above line 3 in Figure 1. Since a duopoly proﬁt is larger
than a triopoly proﬁt (to the right of line 1), the monopoly equilibrium is
illustrated as area A in the ﬁgure. However, the area of interest in Figure
1 is area B. Despite a monopolization being proﬁtable, i.e. π(1) > 3π(3)
and π(1) > 2π(2) r e p r e s e n t e da sa b o v el i n e5a n d3respectively, the triopoly
remains, due to the positive externality on the outsider, ﬁrm c.A f t e rt h eﬁrst
a c q u i s i t i o n ,t h em a r k e ti sc o n c e n t r a t e da n dt h er i v a l( ﬁrm c) now becomes a
duopolist with its corresponding proﬁt. The buyer must now pay a duopoly
proﬁtt ob u yﬁrm c since this is c’s alternative cost. In area B, this is not
proﬁtable for a buyer. This mechanism is referred to as the insiders’ dilemma
and is thus illustrated as area B.
Now, let us see if this monopolization failure can be dissolved if a buyer
uses partial acquisitions. Since there is a positive externality on the out-
s i d e r ,i tm a yb em o r ep r o ﬁtable for the buyer to purchase a share of the
7future outsider before making a full acquisition of the other ﬁrm. This share,
pi ∈ (0,1), is referred to as an outsider-toehold. Having an outsider-toehold
implies a corresponding share of the proﬁti nt h i sﬁrm. We start with the
case where the buyer monopolizes the market according to the following:
1. a buys pc of c
2. a acquires b
3. a acquires (1 − pc) of c
Working backwards and starting with the third period in equilibrium,
ﬁrm c requires a bid, b3
c, of at least the share of the duopoly proﬁt still held
by c,w h i c hi s
b
3
c ≥ (1 − pc)π(2). (3)
Since the buyer oﬀers the bids, and thus has all the bargaining power,
this bid (and all other bids in this section) holds with equality. In the second
period, ﬁrm b requires
b
2
b ≥ π(3), (4)
since the market still consists of three ﬁrms. In the ﬁrst period, ﬁrm c






c ≥ π(3) ⇔ b
1
c ≥ π(3) − b
3
c. (5)
For the ﬁrst bid to ﬁrm c, b1
c,a n dt h eb i dt oﬁrm b, b2
b, to be accepted,
it must be unproﬁt a b l ef o rt h eb u y e rt of o r mad u o p o l y( t ot h el e f to fl i n e2
in Figure 1). The value, b va, of the buyer after a monopolization must exceed
the initial triopoly proﬁt in equilibrium, i.e.






c ≥ π(3).( 6 )
Substituting the bids from equations 3, 4 and 5 into equation 6 implies
π(1) ≥ 3π(3).( 7 )
This is illustrated in Figure 1 as at or above line 5. By subgame perfection,
we also need the following to hold for a monopolization in equilibrium:
π(1) − (1 − pc)π(2) ≥ π(2) + pcπ(2) ⇔ π(1) ≥ 2π(2) (8)
π(1) − (1 − pc)π(2) − π(3) ≥ π(3) + pcπ(3).( 9 )
Equation 8 ensures a buyer to have an incentive to acquire the rest of ﬁrm
c in the third period. The buyer will proﬁt from a monopoly but must pay
for the rest of ﬁrm c, (1 − pc)π(2). The alternative is not to bid and receive
a duopoly proﬁtf r o mt h eo w nﬁrm and the holding share, pc,i nﬁrm c.T h i s
inequality is illustrated as at or above line 3 in Figure 1. Equation 9 must
hold for a monopolization to occur, since the buyer must have an incentive
to continue after the ﬁrst period. A monopoly proﬁtm i n u st h eb i d st oﬁrms
b and c must exceed the triopoly proﬁtf r o mt h eo w nﬁrm and the share of
the triopoly proﬁtf r o mﬁrm c.E q u a t i o n9c a nb er e w r i t t e na s
π(1) ≥ (1 − pc)[π(2) − π(3)] + 3π(3).( 1 0 )
If the outsider-toehold, pc, is zero the inequality holds at or above line 4
in Figure 1. This implies that a monopolization occurs in equilibrium in area
A, which is exactly the same as in the benchmark case. However, when pc
is increasing, line 4 is rotating clockwise around the intersection with lines 5
9and 1 down to line 5 as pc approaches 1. The insiders’ dilemma, area B, is
thus decreasing in the outsider-toehold, pi, and vanishes as pi → 1.
Proposition 1 If π(1) > 2π(2) and π(1) > 3π(3), ∃ a pi ∈ (0,1) where a
monopoly is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 2 The insiders’ dilemma is decreasing in pi.
S e ep r o o f si nt h ea p p e n d i x .
Buying an outsider-toehold mitigates acquisitions as long as there are
positive externalities on outsider ﬁrms, even when a monopoly (or other
market concentration limits) is not allowed or when there are more than
three ﬁrms in the industry. To see this, assume a market with k ﬁrms and
a buyer that reduces the market to k − 2 ﬁrms using the outsider-toehold
strategy. Re-writing equations 1 and 6, we get
b vak = π(k − 2) − 2π(k) >v ak = π(k − 2) − π(k − 1) − π(k),( 1 1 )
since π(k − 1) >π (k).
Proposition 3 Using the outsider-toehold acquisition strategy is more prof-
itable than acquiring entire ﬁrms at once, in all k-ﬁrm markets if π(k−1) >
π(k),∀k>2.
Proposition 3 does not say that all mergers are proﬁtable. If k>3
there exist no-merger equilibria if any of inequality 7-9 do not hold for a
corresponding k-ﬁrm market ∀pi ∈ (0,1).
In this analysis we have only allowed for three periods in the acquisition
game. Relieving this assumption, other partial acquisition strategies can be
an equilibrium, such as buying a small portion of ﬁrm c, a small portion of
10ﬁrm b, and so on until a monopolization. Introducing e.g. a ﬁxed cost (or a
discounting factor) for the buyer in each acquisition period would eliminate
these equilibria. This is intuitive; if the buyer can get all the surplus in two
periods, why use more?
The analysis in this section builds on a ﬁrm with a single owner. An
outsider accepts to sell out a share of the ﬁrm at a lower price than the
actual value. The reason for doing this is the future proﬁtt h eﬁrm will
receive when the rest of the ﬁrm is acquired in the last period. However, this
i sn o tp o s s i b l ew h e nt h eﬁrm has multiple owners. Who wants to sell out
as h a r ei nt h eﬁrst period at this low price, not receiving anything in later
periods? Now the buyer must pay the market price in the ﬁrst period. This
feature will be analyzed in the next section.
2.2 Multiple owners
A ﬁrm with multiple (atomistic) owners can be treated as a listed ﬁrm on
a stock market. When using the same acquisition strategy as in the single
owner case, the bid for the outsider-toehold in the ﬁr s tp e r i o di sd i ﬀerent in
equilibrium. Some owners sell out their share in the ﬁrm in the ﬁrst period
and thus require at least a share of a triopoly proﬁt, b b1
c = pcπ(3),f o rt h e
outsider-toehold since they will not proﬁt from the larger second bid, b3
c in
equation 3, when the ﬁrm is sold in the last period. Hence, owners selling
o u tt h e i rs h a r ei nt h eﬁrst period will gain less than the remaining owners,
since they receive a duopoly proﬁt in the last period. In equilibrium, the ﬁrst
sellers must thus be pivotal, i.e. if rejecting, the monopolization collapses.
H e n c e ,t h es i z eo fpc will be unique in equilibrium and we must look at the
buyer constraint to ﬁnd its value.
The value of a buyer after a monopolization must exceed the triopoly
11proﬁt in an equilibrium. i.e.
b v
v






c = π(1)−(1−pc)[π(2) − π(3)]−2π(3) ≥ π(3). (12)
This constraint is oscillating with pc between lines 4 and 5 in Figure
1, just like equations 9 and 10 in the single owner section. The necessary
constraints for a subgame perfection are equal to the single owner case, since
the acquisition process is the same after the ﬁrst period.
However, to ensure acceptance when buying the outsider-toehold, sellers
must be pivotal. Solving for pc in equation 12 implies
pc ≥ [2π(3) + π(2) − π(1)]/[π(2) − π(3)].
This holds with equality if the right hand side is positive, i.e. in area B in
ﬁgure 1 in a monopolization equilibrium. Otherwise, the insiders’ dilemma
does not exist.
Proposition 4 If the insiders’ dilemma exists, a monopoly is a subgame
p e r f e c tN a s he q u i l i b r i u mw i t hau n i q u epi.
S e ep r o o fi nt h ea p p e n d i x .
The next section discusses the validity of the assumptions but also em-
phasizes a policy implication of the results.
3 Empirical validity and policy implications
Changes in consumer surplus are crucial for the competition authorities when
deciding whether to block a merger. Unfortunately, the merging ﬁrms with
w h i c ht h ec o m p e t i t i o na u t h o r i t i e sd e a lw i t ha r eo f t e nh a r dc a s e sa n dt h e
eﬀects on consumers are diﬃcult to measure. However, merging ﬁrms may
12hold shares in competing ﬁrms to extract proﬁts from the positive externality
a merger may have on other ﬁrms within the industry. This externality harms
consumers and may be blocked. Although there may be other reasons for
holding shares in other ﬁrms, outsider-toeholds may be used as signals of
anti-competitive mergers and these cases need deeper investigations.
Policy implication Holding outsider-toeholds is a signal of an anti-
competitive merger.
The empirical literature studying proﬁts from merging ﬁrms reports a
considerable positive reaction on the stock price of target ﬁrms when an
acquisition is announced. Stock price reactions for the acquirer are more
ambiguous and in general show no signiﬁcant deviations from zero (see e.g.
Bradley, 1988 and Betton Eckbo, 2000). Table 1 reports proﬁts for ﬁrms
after the strategies described in this paper have been carried out. Viewing
sellers as one unity, we can see that the buyer in the single owner case takes
the lion’s share. Sellers will receive the initial triopoly proﬁt. This appears
not to be consistent with the existing literature but may have an explanation.
Only ﬁrms listed on the stock market are included in empirical studies (so-
called event studies) measuring the general eﬀects of a merger and the lack
of results from non-listed ﬁrms still holds the consistency question open.
When ﬁrms are listed on the stock market, i.e. have multiple owners, the
theoretical results are more consistent with the literature when the insiders’
dilemma exists, since the sellers (ﬁrm c) now receive the surplus. This is also
true when the dilemma is not prominent if the monopoly proﬁti sn o tt o o
large in relation to the duopoly proﬁt.
13Table 1: Buyer and Seller Proﬁts
Merger Proﬁtable
No Insider’ Dilemma Insiders’ Dilemma
Single Owners Buyer π(1) − 2π(3) π(1) − 2π(3)
Seller b π(3) π(3)
Seller c π(3) π(3)
Multiple Owners Buyer π(1) − π(2) − π(3) π(3)
Seller b π(3) π(3)
Seller c π(2) π(1) − 2π(3)
Comparing equation 6 and 12, we see that b va > b vv
a for all pc ∈ (0,1)
implying that the value of a buyer is smaller when ﬁrms have multiple owners.
This is due to the higher price a buyer must pay for the outsider-toehold.
In the single owner case, however, the buyer wants the outsider-toehold to
be large for two reasons. First, the insiders’ dilemma is decreasing in pc and
second, by equation 5, the bid for pc m a yb en e g a t i v ew h e nt h eo u t s i d e r -
toehold is too low. This implies that the outsider is giving money to the
buyer when selling out the share pc.N e g a t i v eb i d sm a yn o tb ea c c e p t e do r
not even allowed in reality. Hence, the buyer must raise the bid to at least
zero if pc is too low, which implies a lower proﬁtf o rt h eb u y i n gﬁrm.
So far, there are no restrictions for the buyer. Introducing a maximum size
of the outsider-toehold may restrain the concentration rate. By deﬁnition,
t h eo u t s i d e r - t o e h o l di sj u s tas h a r eo fa n o t h e rﬁrm. If this share is too
large, an acquisition takes place and the target ﬁrm disappears from the
market. In reality, the maximum share an owner can hold in a ﬁrm without
acquiring it depends on the ownership structure in the rest of the ﬁrm.8 The
8According to European Commission IV/M.025 - Arjomari/Wiggins Teape of February
14only reason for the buyer to hold a large share in the outsider is to gain
from its proﬁt, and not to have voting power. If the voting power becomes
too strong, an acquisition takes place, which is not the intention. In fact,
in countries where diﬀerent shares (A- and B-shares) have diﬀerent voting
power9, concentrations of markets are facilitated according to the outsider-
toehold theory. A buyer can receive a majority of the proﬁti nt h eo u t s i d e r ,
i.e. pc > 0.5, by holding a large part of the B-shares (weak voting power)
but still being a minority voter (if no or few A-shares are held).
Conjecture 5 Shares with diﬀerent voting power mitigate acquisitions.
In the acquisition game of the model, only one ﬁrm can make acquisitions.
To give you a ﬂavour of what will happen when this assumption is relieved,
we can consider the following. Assume that ﬁrm a holds, exogenously, an
outsider-toehold, p,i nﬁrm c. Firms are listed on the stock market and have
multiple atomistic stockholders, only one merger is allowed and agents in the
stockmarket do not expect a merger. Four cases are possible; no merger,
mergers a-b, a-c or c-b. If no merger occurs ﬁrms a, b and c proﬁt (1+p)π(3),
π(3) and (1 − p)π(3) respectively. If one merger occurs, a-b generates a
combined proﬁto f(1 + p)π(2), a-c of π(2),a n db-c of (1 − 0.5p)π(2).T h e
split of p in the last case is due to the assumption that ﬁrms b and c are of
equal size and ﬁrm a’s ownership in c,a sap e r c e n t a g e ,i so n l yh a l fo ft h e
initial size in the new ﬁrm, b-c.
The a-b merger surplus is (1 + p)π(2) − (1 + p)π(3) − π(3) and hence
10, 1990, an acquisition takes place if a majority of the voting rights are held. A minority
of the voting rights may also be treated as an acquisition if these votes obtain a majority at
the shareholders’ meeting, due to the remaining votes being spread out among many small
shareholders. In the US, the so-called supermajority is applicable in many antitakeover
amendments, stating that a change in control requires shareholder approval by at least a
two-third vote and sometimes as much as 90 percent of the voting power.
9Such as in e.g. France and Sweden.
15positive iﬀ p>(2π(3)−π(2))/(π(2)−π(3)). In fact, this is the only merger
that may be proﬁtable since a-c creates a surplus of π(2) − 2π(3),w h i c hi s
negative since merger to duopoly is unproﬁtable and the b-c s u r p l u si sa l w a y s
negative.
Now, ignore all assumptions from Figure 1 and simply assume that one
merger takes place (without expectation from the stockmarket). The rel-





π(3). The two other mergers both result in
a smaller relative change, i.e. 1
2
π(2)
π(3) respectively. Hence, in this perspective, it
c a nb ea r g u e dt h a ta l l o w i n ga l lﬁrms to merge would not change the market
outcome, i.e. ﬁrms a and b would still merge. Note, however, that although
a merger and an acquisition can be treated equally, this analysis does not
specify an equilibrium bidding price, as in sections 2.1 and 2.2.
Conjecture 6 Merging ﬁr m sw i t ha no u t s i d e r - t o e h o l dg e n e r a t eal a r g e rr e l -
ative surplus than merging ﬁrms without outsider-toeholds.
4 Conclusions
It has been shown in economic theory that there exists an important ob-
stacle to anti-competitive mergers in oligopolies: being an outsider to an
anti-competitive merger is often more proﬁtable than participating, since
outsiders beneﬁt from a price increase, but need not reduce their own out-
put. This implies that unproﬁtable mergers may not occur, i.e. the insiders’
dilemma. However, this paper demonstrates that this theoretical puzzle can
b es o l v e d .H o l d i n gas h a r ei nac o m p e t i n gﬁrm, an outsider-toehold, dissolves
the dilemma and all proﬁtable mergers occur in equilibrium.
The analysis is split into ﬁrms with single owners and ﬁrms with multiple
16owners, i.e. ﬁrms listed in the stock market. In the single owner case there
exist a unique monopoly equilibrium with multiple acquisition strategies,
since the size of the outsider-toehold can vary independently of the buyer’s
proﬁt. When ﬁrms have multiple owners it is only necessary to buy an
outsider-toehold when the insiders’ dilemma exists. In this case the size of
the outsider-toehold is unique in equilibrium.
T h e r ei sapolicy implication of this result. The insiders’ dilemma arises
from the assumption of a positive externality on the outsider ﬁrm and ac-
quiring an outsider-toehold is thus a signal of an anti-competitive merger.
Furthermore, the theoretical results indicate that the target receives the large
portion of the merger surplus, which is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings.
In some countries stocks for one ﬁrm are divided into two diﬀerent categories
on the stock market; stocks with strong and weak voting power. It has been
argued that this split of the stocks thwart takeovers since a small capital
share may be enough for controlling the ﬁrm if the capital is invested in the
strong voting power stocks. This conclusion is contrary to the result in this
paper. The only reason for buying an outsider-toehold is to extract proﬁt
from the corresponding ﬁrm and not to have voting power. In fact, the less
voting power for a buyer, the larger an outsider-toehold can be without tak-
ing over the ﬁrm (acquiring it). Hence, weak voting power stocks mitigate
acquisitions.
Finally a word of caution. Theoretically, it has been proved that prof-
itable mergers may not occur since outsider ﬁrms may gain more than merg-
ing ﬁrms. One solution to this theoretical problem is to write contingent
contracts between all ﬁrms in the industry making a market concentration
possible. However, this is not legal. Furthermore it may be questioned if the
insiders’ dilemma is also relevant in the real world. Nevertheless, this paper
17oﬀers a legal way of solving this theoretical puzzle created in the merger
literature.
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AP r o o f s
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider three periods where ﬁrm a in period 1 buys pc of ﬁrm c,i np e r i o d2
acquires ﬁrm b a n di np e r i o d3a c q u i r e s(1 −pc) of ﬁrm c.F i r ma oﬀers (p1
c,
π(3)−(1−p1
c)π(2)), (1,π (3)) and ((1−p1
c), (1−p1
c)π(2)) respectively, in the
three periods and sellers respond by accept, accept and accept. By backward
induction, ﬁrm c proﬁts (1 − p1
c)π(2) in period 3 by rejecting, which is not
larger than accepting. In period 2, ﬁrm b proﬁts π(3) by rejecting, which is
not larger than accepting since merger to duopoly is unproﬁtable. Firm c
proﬁts π(3) by rejecting in period 1, since merger to duopoly is unproﬁtable
and responses are irrevocable. This proﬁt is not larger than the proﬁtf r o m
accepting, i.e. the sum of bids from periods 1 and 3. Hence, conditional on
the proposed bids, the responses from sellers constitute a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium.
In period 3, ﬁrm a oﬀers the bid if it results in at least as high a net proﬁt
as that received by not bidding, i.e.
π(1) − (1 − p
1
c)π(2) ≥ π(2) + p
1
cπ(2) ⇔ π(1) ≥ 2π(2).( 1 3 )
Bidding according to the strategy must result in a higher net proﬁtt h a n
21not bidding in period 2, i.e.
π(1) − (1 − p
1
c)π(2) − π(3) ≥ π(3) + p
1
cπ(3).( 1 4 )
Another strategy is to acquire (1 − pc) of ﬁrm c in period 2 and acquire
ﬁrm b in period 3, paying (1 − pc)π(3) and π(2) respectively. This cannot
be proﬁtable for ﬁrm a since these payments can never be smaller than the
payments in the prevailing strategy. In the ﬁrst period, ﬁrm a’s strategy
must be more proﬁtable than not bidding, i.e.
π(1) − (1 − p
1
c)π(2) − π(3) − (π(3) − (1 − p
1
c)π(2)) ≥ π(3).( 1 5 )
⇐⇒ π(1) ≥ 3π(3).
A higher bid, in all respective periods, is giving money away and a lower
bid is not accepted by the seller. If π(1) > 2π(2) and π(1) > 3π(3), ∃
a pc ∈ (0,1) where inequality 14 is fulﬁlled. Consequently there exist an
inﬁnite number of equilibrium strategies. QED.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2




c)=π(1) − (1 − p
1






= π(2) − π(3) > 0.
QED.
22A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Consider the ﬁrst period bid ([2π(3) + π(2) − π(1)]/[π(2) − π(3)], [[2π(3) +
π(2)−π(1)]/[π(2)−π(3)]]π(3)) if [2π(3)+π(2)−π(1)]/[π(2)−π(3)] > 0 and
(1;π(3)) otherwise, assuming everything else equal as in proposition 1.
If [2π(3)+π(2)−π(1)]/[π(2)−π(3)] > 0,r e j e c t i n gi m p l i e s[[2π(3)+π(2)−
π(1)]/[π(2) − π(3)]]π(3) since merger to duopoly is not proﬁtable, which is
not larger than accepting. The buyer bids iﬀ
π(1) − (1 − [[2π(3) + π(2) − π(1)]/[π(2) − π(3)]])π(2) − π(3)
−[[2π(3) + π(2) − π(1)]/[π(2) − π(3)]]π(3) ≥ π(3)
⇐⇒ π(3) ≥ π(3).
A higher bid or a lower share, p1
c, is hence unproﬁtable and a lower bid is
not accepted by sellers. A higher share, p1
c, will not ensure acceptance from
all sellers in equilibrium.
If [2π(3) + π(2) − π(1)]/[π(2) − π(3)] ≤ 0, rejecting implies π(3) since
merger to duopoly is not proﬁtable, which is not larger than accepting. The
buyer bids iﬀ
π(1) − π(2) − π(3) ≥ π(3)
which holds since [2π(3) + π(2) − π(1)]/[π(2) − π(3)] ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ π(1) ≥
2π(3)+π(2). A higher bid means giving money away and a lower bid is not
accepted. Consequently, it is only necessary to acquire an outsider-toehold
when the insiders’ dilemma exists, i.e. [2π(3)+π(2)−π(1)]/[π(2)−π(3)] > 0,
a s s u m i n gt h em e r g e rt ob ep r o ﬁtable. QED
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